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NOVARTIS AG v. UNION OF INDIA: WHY THE 
COURT’S NARROW INTEPRETATION OF 
ENHANCED EFFICACY THREATENS 
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT 
KEVIN TARSA* 
Abstract: Through the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, the Indian Parlia-
ment revised the Patents Act of 1970 to permit the grant of patents for pharma-
ceutical products. A core provision in the 2005 Amendment was Section 3(d), 
which prohibited granting patents to a new form of a known substance that did 
not enhance the efficacy of that substance. In Novartis AG v. Union of India, the 
Supreme Court of India applied this new provision to Novartis’s patent applica-
tion for the final form of its drug Gleevec. The court engaged in an unreasona-
bly narrow analysis of enhanced efficacy, potentially stifling secondary patents 
on important drugs and creating significant uncertainty for pharmaceutical com-
panies going forward. Novartis AG evinces the ongoing tension between main-
taining India’s status as the “pharmacy of the world” and promoting scientific 
innovation in South Asia.  
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2013, the Supreme Court of India upheld the Indian Patent Of-
fice’s rejection of Novartis’s patent application for the final form of its thera-
peutic drug Gleevec.1 Gleevec, which comprises the beta crystalline form of a 
chemical compound called imatinib mesylate, is a drug that treats chronic 
myeloid leukemia and certain tumors.2 In deciding whether to grant Novartis 
a patent, the Supreme Court of India faced tremendous pressure to satisfy 
competing interests: encouraging scientific innovation and making life-saving 
drugs available to the world’s neediest citizens.3 On the one hand, the court 
was urged to promote scientific research and development by affording mo-
nopolistic protection to the producers of novel drugs, in keeping with India’s 
                                                                                                                           
 * Kevin Tarsa is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 Novartis AG v. Union of India, AIR 2013 SC, App. No. 2706-2716 of 2013, ¶¶ 3, 14, 195, 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf [https://perma.cc/53RA-2LDX]. 
 2 Id. ¶ 3. 
 3 See id. ¶ 4. 
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obligations under international treaties. 4  On the other hand, non-
governmental organizations and legal-aid societies implored the court to pro-
tect India’s generic drug producers and thus maintain India’s status as the 
“pharmacy of the world.”5 
Novartis AG v. Union of India is significant because it tests the ambit 
and purpose of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 (2005 Amend-
ment).6 One of the core issues of the case is whether, under Section 3(d) of 
the 2005 Amendment, the final version of Gleevec enhances the “known effi-
cacy” of the previous form of the drug.7 Novartis contended that Section 3(d) 
was immaterial to the case, but the court did not find this argument persua-
sive.8 It ruled that Section 3(d) serves as an additional bar for drugs to clear in 
order to prevent “evergreening,” the practice of making trivial changes to an 
existing product simply to extend the patentee’s exclusive rights over the 
product.9 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the facts of Novartis 
AG, the history of Indian patent law, and procedural history of the legal pro-
ceedings in India. Part II discusses the statutory provisions at issue in the 
case, the court’s analysis of these issues, and its holding. Part III critiques the 
court’s narrow interpretation of enhanced efficacy, analyzes the court’s poor 
understanding of evergreening, and explains why Novartis AG has created 
uncertainty for drug producers seeking secondary patents in the future. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Novartis Obtains Patent for Gleevec in the United States 
On May 28, 1996, a medicinal chemist named Jürg Zimmermann re-
ceived a U.S. patent for a number of chemical derivatives (the “Zimmermann 
patent”)—including the compound imatinib, which can be used to create anti-
tumoral drugs.10 Nearly five years later, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) approved Gleevec in the form of 50- and 100-milligram capsules, 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. 
 5 Id.; see Dorothy Du, Novartis AG v. Union of India: “Evergreening,” Trips, and Enhanced 
Efficacy Under Section 3(d), 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 247 (2014). 
 6 See AIR 2013 SC ¶ 103. 
 7 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 § 3(d), No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2005), http://
indiacode.nic.in [https://perma.cc/2RGC-QEZH] [hereinafter 2005 Amendment]; see Novartis AG, 
AIR 2013 SC ¶¶ 3, 158. 
 8 See Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶¶ 99–100, 102. 
 9 See id. ¶¶ 100, 103. 
 10 Novartis AG v. Union of India, AIR 2013 SC, App. No. 2706-2716 of 2013, ¶ 5, http://
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf [https://perma.cc/53RA-2LDX]; New Treatment for 
Chronic Myelogenous Leukaemia (CML): European Inventor of the Year 2009 in the Category 
“Industry,” EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/learning-events/european-inventor/finalists/2009/
zimmermann.html [https://perma.cc/Y46S-K3PM] (last visited Apr. 27, 2016). 
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which used imatinib mesylate as their active ingredient.11 Shortly thereafter, 
Gleevec hit the market on the basis of the Zimmermann patent.12 
On January 18, 2000, Novartis applied for a U.S. patent for the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate.13 The patent examiner initially rejected 
Novartis’s application, but, on appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals and Inter-
ferences reversed the patent examiner’s decision.14 The board determined that 
although the Zimmermann patent teaches any person skilled in the art how to 
use imatinib in a pharmaceutical product to treat tumors, it does not explain 
how to use the beta crystalline form to do so.15 Thus, Novartis’s development 
of the beta crystalline form in a pharmaceutical composition constituted a 
“manipulative step”16 in the treatment of tumor disease.17 Consequently, the 
U.S. patent board granted Novartis a patent for the beta crystalline form on 
May 17, 2005. 18 
B. Novartis Seeks Patent for Gleevec in India 
Novartis filed a patent application for the beta crystalline form of 
imatinib mesylate on July 17, 1998, in the Chennai Patent Office.19 Novartis 
claimed that its product was superior to imatinib mesylate in its free-base 
form for a variety of reasons, including that it stored better and was easier to 
process.20 When Novartis filed its application, the patent law in India was in a 
transitional stage, and, as a result, its application was put on hold.21 Before its 
application was considered, several amendments were introduced to the Indi-
an Patents Act of 1970 that fundamentally shifted the nation’s patent law.22 
Most importantly, the 2005 Amendment strengthened India’s intellectual prop-
erty laws by permitting the grant of patents for pharmaceutical products.23 
When the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs finally reviewed No-
                                                                                                                           
 11 Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶¶ 119, 121. 
 12 See id. ¶¶ 115, 119. 
 13 Id. ¶ 115. Novartis derived the beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate in a two-stage 
process. Id. ¶ 6. Beginning with imatinib in free-base form, it produced its methanesulfonic addi-
tion salt, imatinib mesylate, and then developed the beta-crystalline form of the salt. Id. 
 14 Id. ¶ 123. 
 15 Id. ¶ 124. 
 16 “A ‘manipulative step’ may or may not be an ‘inventive step,’” which is required under 
Indian law. Id. at 67 n.1. An inventive step is “a feature of an invention that involves technical 
advance as compared to the existing knowledge, or having economic significance or both and that 
makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art.” Id. ¶ 89. 
 17 See id. ¶ 124. 
 18 See id. ¶ 115. 
 19 Id. ¶ 8. 
 20 See id. ¶¶ 8, 175. 
 21 Id. ¶ 12. 
 22 Id. ¶ 10. 
 23 See id. ¶¶ 74–75. 
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vartis’s application on December 15, 2005, it rejected it because the beta crys-
talline form was anticipated by the Zimmermann patent, was “obvious to a 
person skilled in the art” given the information disclosed in the Zimmermann 
patent, and was disallowed by Section 3(d) of the 2005 Amendment.24 
C. Procedural History 
At the time of the Assistant Controller’s rejection of Novartis’s patent 
application, the appellate authority under the 2005 Amendment had not yet 
become functional; thus, Novartis filed writ petitions directly before the 
Madras High Court challenging the patent application’s rejection.25 Novartis 
filed two additional writ petitions seeking a declaration that Section 3(d) of 
the 2005 Amendment was unconstitutional because it violated Article 14 of 
the Indian Constitution and was not in compliance with the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).26 Following 
the formation of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), the writ 
petitions were transferred from the High Court to the IPAB on April 4, 
2007.27 On August 6, 2007, the High Court dismissed the two writ petitions 
challenging the validity of Section 3(d).28 Almost two years later, on June 26, 
2009, the IPAB dismissed Novartis’s appeals against the orders of the Assis-
tant Controller.29 Although the IPAB reversed the findings of the Assistant 
Controller on the issues of novelty and obviousness, it affirmed the Assistant 
Controller’s ruling that Section 3(d) precluded Novartis from receiving a 
product patent.30 The IPAB nevertheless ruled that Novartis could receive a 
process patent for preparing imatinib mesylate in beta crystalline form.31 No-
vartis subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court of India under Article 136 
of the Indian Constitution.32 Although Novartis’s prescribed remedy was to 
challenge the judgment of the IPAB before the Madras High Court, the Su-
preme Court of India agreed to hear the case because it involved a number of 
seminal patent-law issues and was likely to reach the Supreme Court of India 
eventually.33 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. ¶ 14. 
 25 Id. ¶ 15. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. ¶ 16. 
 30 See id. ¶¶ 17, 20. 
 31 Id. ¶ 20. 
 32 Id. ¶ 21. 
 33 Id. 
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D. History of Indian Patent Law 
The Novartis AG litigation took place during a transitional period in In-
dian patent law—between an era that prohibited granting patents for drugs 
and an era that permitted it.34 When Novartis submitted its application for an 
Indian patent in 1998, the patent legislation then in effect, the Patents Act of 
1970, forbade patents for “substances intended for use, or capable of being 
used, as . . . medicine or drug, or prepared or produced by chemical process-
es.”35 In the late 1950’s, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar observed that India’s 
first patent legislation, the Patents and Designs Act of 1911, had failed to 
achieve its principal goal: “to stimulate invention among Indians and to en-
courage the development and exploitation of new inventions for industrial 
purposes in the country so as to secure the benefits thereof to the largest sec-
tion of the public.”36 India’s patent regime was so deficient that between 1930 
and 1937, India granted foreigners nine times as many patents as it did to In-
dian citizens—even though it established several institutions for post-
graduate training and numerous laboratories after independence.37 Moreover, 
the few inventions that Indians did produce were of little economic or scien-
tific value in comparison to the patents held by foreigners.38 
In an effort to make India’s patent system more favorable to domestic 
inventors, Justice Ayyangar looked at patent laws abroad.39 Through his re-
search, Justice Ayyangar discovered that many of the world’s developed 
countries—including Japan, Germany, and the U.S.S.R.—permitted the grant 
of patents for chemical processes but not for chemical products.40 Further-
more, notwithstanding the United States, few countries openly granted pa-
tents for medical products.41 Justice Ayyangar found this state of law compel-
ling because it was based on a rationale that prioritized public health over 
monopolistic protection.42 By barring the grant of pharmaceutical product 
patents, competition among drug producers would increase, and important 
drugs would be made available to the general public at the lowest possible 
cost.43 To that end, Justice Ayyangar submitted a comprehensive report in 
which he recommended that the Indian government pass legislation to bar the 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See id. ¶ 24. 
 35 The Patents Act, 1970 § 5, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (1970); Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC 
¶ 24. 
 36 Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶¶ 34, 37. 
 37 See id. ¶ 35. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. ¶¶ 34, 37, 41. 
 40 Id. ¶ 41. 
 41 See id. ¶ 42. 
 42 See id. ¶¶ 42, 45. 
 43 Id. ¶ 42. 
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grant of patents for pharmaceutical products.44 The Indian government fol-
lowed his recommendations by enacting the Patents Act of 1970.45 
The enactment of the Patents Act of 1970 shifted power in the Indian 
pharmaceutical market to indigenous producers, leading to a dramatic in-
crease in the production of bulk drugs.46 Between 1970 and the early 2000s, 
India exported substantially more pharmaceutical products than in years past, 
and it gained worldwide recognition as a preeminent producer of affordable, 
high-quality bulk drugs.47 
As India’s domestic pharmaceutical industry grew stronger, however, 
changes at the international level profoundly affected India’s patent law.48 In 
1995, TRIPS was enacted, which required all World Trade Organization 
(WTO) member nations to grant patent protection for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts.49 To comply with its international obligations, the Indian parliament 
contentiously passed the 2005 Amendment, which brought India’s intellectual 
property law into harmony with other WTO nations.50 Although the 2005 
Amendment authorized the patenting of pharmaceutical products, it did not 
do so without imposing restrictions on the grant of such patents—specifically, 
through the implementation of Section 3(d).51 
II. DISCUSSION 
The statutory provisions at issue in Novartis AG v. Union of India are 
clauses (j) and (ja) of Section 2(1) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002 
and Section 3(d) of the 2005 Amendment.52 The drug for which Novartis 
sought a patent was not something entirely new; rather, it emerged from the 
Zimmermann patent.53 Because Novartis’s product contained a polymorph of 
a preexisting substance—namely, imatinib mesylate—Novartis did not 
merely have to satisfy the traditional patent requirements of novelty, non-
obviousness, and usefulness.54 It also had to clear a second bar in Section 3(d), 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
 45 See id. ¶ 43. 
 46 See id. ¶¶ 54–56. 
 47 See id. ¶¶ 57–58. 
 48 Id. ¶ 59. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. ¶¶ 74, 85. 
 51 See id. ¶ 94. 
 52 See AIR 2013 SC, App. No. 2706-2716 of 2013, ¶ 3, http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/
outtoday/patent.pdf [https://perma.cc/53RA-2LDX]. 
 53 See Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶ 108. 
 54 See The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 § 2(1)(j), No. 38 of 2002, India Code (2002), 
http://indiacode.nic.in [https://perma.cc/2RGC-QEZH] [hereinafter 2002 Amendment]; Novartis 
AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶ 158. Section 2(1) uses the term “inventive step” instead of non-obviousness 
and the term “capable of industrial application” instead of useful. 2002 Amendment § 2(1); see 
Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶ 89; see also Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC at 29, n.1 (explaining that 
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which provides that “the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance 
which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that sub-
stance” does not qualify as an invention.55 
The threshold issue for the Supreme Court of India was whether Novar-
tis’s product satisfied the definition of “invention” in Section 2(1).56 Section 
2(1)(j) provides that an invention is a “new product or process involving an 
inventive step and capable of industrial application.”57 An inventive step is a 
“feature of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the 
existing knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes 
the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”58 
Novartis argued that it produced imatinib mesylate in beta crystalline 
form through two inventions. 59  First, Novartis derived imatinib mesylate 
from imatinib in free-base form by selecting example 21 of the thirty-seven 
compounds provided in the Zimmermann patent and then adding methanesul-
fonic acid to that particular compound.60 Because the Zimmermann patent did 
not instruct a person to select example 21 instead of the others—much less 
instruct a person how to produce imatinib mesylate from example 21—
Novartis argued that its derivation constituted an invention.61 Second, seeking 
to produce a form of the compound that could be ingested orally by humans, 
Novartis synthesized a beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate through 
further independent research.62 
The court addressed each of Novartis’s claimed inventions separately.63 
First, the court rejected Novartis’s argument that its production of imatinib 
mesylate constituted an invention.64 Specifically, the court stated that because 
imatinib mesylate was a known substance from the Zimmermann patent and 
because a journal, Cancer Research, had published an article in 1996 that 
focused on the anti-tumoral properties of the compound, it did not qualify as a 
                                                                                                                           
the terms used in Section 2(1)(j) of the 2002 Amendment and in TRIPS correlate with the tradi-
tional requirements of non-obviousness and usefulness). 
 55 2005 Amendment § 3(d); see Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶¶ 17, 158. Section 3(d) makes 
unpatentable in India some drugs that would be patentable in other countries. Novartis AG, AIR 
2013 SC ¶ 17. Through Section 3(d), the Indian Parliament sought to prevent evergreening and to 
ensure that the citizens of India had access to life-saving drugs. See id. ¶ 18. 
 56 See Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶ 3. 
 57 Id. ¶ 71. 
 58 2002 Amendment § 2(l)(ja).  
 59 Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶ 105. 
 60 See id. ¶ 106. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. ¶ 107. 
 63 See id. ¶¶ 157–158. 
 64 See id. ¶ 157. 
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new product. 65 Second, in analyzing whether the beta crystalline form of 
imatinib mesylate qualified as an invention, the court reasoned that Section 
3(d) of the 2005 Amendment applied directly to the question because the beta 
crystalline form was a polymorph of a known substance.66 Novartis argued 
that Section 3(d) was not applicable to this issue for two reasons—both of 
which the court rejected.67 First, the court rejected Novartis’s argument that 
as long as Novartis’s product satisfies Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja), it need not 
satisfy Section 3(d) because 3(d) is a provision ex majore cautela.68 Citing the 
Parliamentary debate that preceded Section 3(d)’s enactment, the court ob-
served that the section was not inessential; rather, it was specifically designed 
to address patents for pharmaceutical products.69 Additionally, the court re-
jected Novartis’s argument that Section 3(d) did not apply because imatinib 
mesylate was not a known substance with known efficacy.70 The court ruled 
that imatinib mesylate was a known substance with known efficacy because 
the Zimmermann patent protected it and because the New Drug Application 
that Novartis submitted to the U.S. FDA explicitly stated that the drug had 
undergone “extensive preclinical, technical and clinical research.”71 
On the issue of whether the beta crystalline form enhanced the efficacy 
of a known substance with known efficacy, the court first had to determine 
what substance immediately preceded the subject compound.72 Because No-
vartis argued in court that imatinib mesylate was the immediate precursor to 
the beta crystalline form, the court required Novartis to prove that the beta 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See id. ¶¶ 127, 157. Although Novartis conceded that the Zimmermann patent covered 
imatinib mesylate, it argued that the patent did not disclose the compound so as to enable a person 
skilled in the art to prepare it. See id. ¶ 134. The court, however, rejected this distinction:  
We certainly do not wish the law of patent in this country to develop on lines where 
there may be a vast gap between the coverage and the disclosure under the patent; 
where the scope of the patent is determined not on the intrinsic worth of the inven-
tion but by the artful drafting of its claims by skillful lawyers . . . . 
See id. ¶¶ 156–157. 
 66 See id. ¶ 158. 
 67 See id. ¶¶ 102–103, 160. 
 68 Id. ¶¶ 99, 100, 102. Ex majore cautela means “[o]ut of abundant caution.” Id. at 55, n.2. 
 69 See id. ¶¶ 102–103 (“[S]ection 3(d) was the only provision cited by the Government to 
allay the fears of the Opposition members concerning the abuses to which a product patent in 
medicines may be vulnerable.”). 
 70 See id. ¶¶ 158–160. 
 71 See id. ¶¶ 160–161 (explaining that the clinical studies featured both tolerability and effica-
cy components and included 1234 patients with chronic myeloid leukemia and other Ph+ leukemi-
as as participants). 
 72 See 2005 Amendment § 3(d); Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶ 165. During the hearing, No-
vartis emphasized that imatinib mesylate immediately preceded the beta-crystalline form; howev-
er, Novartis’s patent application and supporting affidavits suggested that imatinib in free-base 
form immediately preceded the beta-crystalline form. See Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶¶ 165, 170. 
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crystalline form had enhanced efficacy in comparison to imatinib mesylate.73 
However, because the court found nothing in Novartis’s application or in its 
supporting affidavits that enabled the court to compare the efficacy of the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate to imatinib mesylate, the court focused 
on whether the beta crystalline enhanced the efficacy of imatinib in free-base 
form. 74 The court invoked the definition of efficacy provided in The New 
Oxford Dictionary of English: “the ability to produce a desired or intended 
result.”75 Reasoning that efficacy with respect to drugs refers to therapeutic 
efficacy, the court opined that Section 3(d) should be applied narrowly: simp-
ly because a property is beneficial or advantageous does not mean that the 
property relates to the efficacy of the drug.76 After considering the testimony 
of two expert witnesses, the court ruled that the claimed improvements of the 
beta crystalline form—more beneficial flow properties, better thermodynamic 
stability, lower hygroscopicity, and increased bioavailability—though valua-
ble, did not enhance the therapeutic efficacy of imatinib mesylate.77 There-
fore, the court ruled that Novartis’ beta crystalline form was not patentable 
under clauses (j) and (ja) of Section 2(1) and Section 3(d), and dismissed No-
vartis’s appeal with costs.78 
III. ANALYSIS 
Novartis AG v. Union of India is not the only recent case that has frus-
trated multinational pharmaceutical companies’ attempts to break into India’s 
expanding drug market.79 In November 2012, the IPAB denied patent protec-
tion to Roche Holding AG’s hepatitis C drug Pegasys, holding that the drug 
was “obvious” and thus did not satisfy India’s inventiveness requirement.80 
Only several months later, in March 2013, the Indian Patents Office granted a 
compulsory license to Natco Pharma, permitting it to sell a generic version of 
Bayer AG’s cancer drug Nexavar at a fraction of the price for which Bayer 
sells its own drug.81 These cases illustrate the difficulties that modern changes 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Novartis AG, AIR 2013 SC ¶¶ 170–171. 
 74 See id. ¶¶ 171, 175. 
 75 See id. ¶ 180. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. ¶¶ 183–190. 
 78 See id. ¶ 195. 
 79 See R. Jai Krishna & Jeanne Whalen, Novartis Loses Glivec Patent Battle in India, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323296504578395672582230106 
[https://perma.cc/S9PB-W3KN] (noting India’s drug market is expected to grow to $48.8 billion by 
2020 according to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP).  
 80 See Rumman Ahmed, India Revokes Roche Patent, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204846304578096483954249650 [https://perma.cc/YLB3-MBCJ]. 
 81 See Anupama Chandrasekaran, India Board Rules Against Bayer in Cancer Drug Patent 
Case, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/us-india-bayer-idUSBRE
9230LC20130304 [https://perma.cc/8HP2-9Y4X]. 
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to Indian patent law have created for multinational drug companies trying to 
enter India’s pharmaceutical marketplace.82 Moreover, they raise the question 
whether India’s patent regime has become overly protective of public health 
at the expense of important drug development.83 
A. Why Therapeutic Efficacy Is Too Narrow 
By limiting “enhancement of . . . known efficacy” in Section 3(d) to 
therapeutic efficacy, the Supreme Court of India engaged in an unreasonably 
narrow analysis of the issue, potentially stifling veritable innovation by drug 
producers.84 The court’s restrictive interpretation of efficacy excludes many 
important improvements on a drug—including increased bioavailability, 85 
increased heat stability inside the body, longer shelf-life, and reduction of 
microbial growth—because they do not result in an enhanced healing effect 
on the body.86 For example, if a medication that can be delivered to the body 
only via mucosal administration were made orally administrable, the in-
creased absorption into the body caused by the modification would not be 
sufficient to make the product patentable under this interpretation of Section 
3(d).87 These improvements have the potential to increase the efficiency of 
drugs, lengthening their maximal potency and enabling patients to take small-
er doses.88 
Rather than limiting its interpretation of Section 3(d) to therapeutic effi-
cacy, the Supreme Court of India should have adopted either of the two fol-
lowing interpretations.89 First, the court could have reasonably found that the 
inventive-step and industrial-application requirements in Section 2(1)(j) en-
compass the enhanced-efficacy requirement. 90 Because “the inventive step 
and industrial application requirements themselves require some level of in-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Ahmed, supra note 80; Chandrasekaran, supra note 81. 
 83 See Andrew Q. Leba, Lowering the “Efficacy” Threshold for Section 3(d) of the Indian 
Patents (Amendment) Act 2005: A Case for a Broader Scope, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 649, 675–
76 (2014); see also Chandrasekaran, supra note 81 (noting that there are concerns about the level 
of protection for intellectual property in the country). 
 84 See 2005 Amendment § 3(d); Leba, supra note 83, at 678. 
 85 Bioavailability is the “degree to which a drug or other substance is absorbed or reaches a 
target site in the body.” Jodie Liu, Compulsory Licensing and Anti-Evergreening: Interpreting the 
TRIPS Flexibilities in Sections 84 and 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 
220 (2015). 
 86 See Leba, supra note 83, at 678–79; see also Liu, supra note 85, at 220. 
 87 See Leba, supra note 83, at 679 (“[S]ince the oral version of the drug has the same ‘healing 
effects’ as the mucosal administration version, it does not have any ‘therapeutic efficacy’ and may 
not be protected by a patent.”). 
 88 Id. at 678–79. 
 89 See Novartis AG v. Union of India, AIR 2013 SC, App. No. 2706-2716 of 2013, ¶ 187, 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf [https://perma.cc/53RA-2LDX]; Du, supra 
note 5, at 242. 
 90 See 2002 Amendment § 2(1)(j); Du, supra note 5, at 242. 
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creased efficacy above the prior art in order to obtain a patent,” functionally, 
Section 3(d) is not a second bar to clear, but rather is a reminder to patent ex-
aminers not to extend patents for drugs that are considered obvious.91 Alter-
natively, the court could have found that enhanced-efficacy refers broadly to 
improvements in the functioning of drugs.92 Either of these interpretations 
would have been more appropriate to apply because they are receptive to the 
fact that scientific innovation occurs incrementally.93 Moreover, some inno-
vations that have no healing effect on the body can nevertheless “produce 
significant improvements in drug delivery and allow more people to benefit 
from the drug’s effects.”94 Thus, by limiting its interpretation of Section 3(d) 
to therapeutic efficacy, the Supreme Court of India may have hurt the poten-
tial beneficiaries of valuable ancillary drug improvements.95 
B. The Supreme Court’s Faulty Understanding of Evergreening 
Evergreening is commonly misunderstood, and the threat it poses is per-
haps exaggerated.96 A drug company engages in evergreening when it ex-
tends the “market exclusivity of a drug beyond the life of its original patent 
by obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of that drug, includ-
ing the active ingredient, formulations, methods of manufacturing, chemical 
intermediates, mechanisms of actions, packaging, screening methods, and 
biological targets.”97 Evergreening, however, is sometimes described as ob-
taining a second patent for the same subject matter while a preexisting patent 
is in effect.98 Obtaining such a patent would be impossible under Indian law 
because India requires that patents be granted only to products that feature an 
“inventive step” and are novel.99 Other times, evergreening is described as 
enabling the creator of a reformulation of a drug to obtain an extension of the 
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original drug patent.100 This, too, evidences a misunderstanding of evergreen-
ing because patent expiration is a legal process that cannot be overridden or 
circumvented.101 
The court in Novartis AG manifested a poor understanding of evergreen-
ing when it compared the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate to distant 
free-base imatinib, rather than imatinib mesylate.102 Because it was not capa-
ble of being administered as a drug to humans in the first place, free-base 
imatinib lacked evergreening potential.103 Counsel for Novartis testified that 
free-base imatinib, “[i]f given in solid dosage form, . . . would sit in the stom-
ach like a brick and would pass out with no therapeutic effect.”104 Despite the 
fact that free-base imatinib could not be administered as a drug, the court pre-
cluded Novartis from receiving a patent for a product that likely would have 
benefitted patients.105 The court thus indicated that evergreening may include 
“the transformation of an entirely inert substance into one that actually pro-
duces an effect on the human body.”106 This suggestion is unsettling because 
the court’s application of Section 3(d) barred the grant of a patent for a phar-
maceutical product that the Indian Parliament, in targeting evergreening, like-
ly had no intention to exclude.107 
C. Uncertainty Going Forward 
The court’s failure to identify what constitutes sufficient evidence of en-
hanced efficacy creates great uncertainty for pharmaceutical companies seek-
ing to obtain secondary patents in India in the future.108 The court concluded 
that “whether or not an increase in bioavailability leads to an enhancement of 
therapeutic efficacy in any given case must be specifically claimed and estab-
lished by research data.”109 Although the court ruled that Novartis did not 
provide sufficient research data, it did not identify what type or amount of 
data would be enough to prove enhanced efficacy.110 
Even if a certain amount of data is sufficient to prove enhanced efficacy, 
it is unreasonable to require drug manufacturers to prove enhanced efficacy 
so early in the drug-development process.111 In his amicus brief to the court 
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in Novartis AG, Shamnad Basheer, a law professor at West Bengal University 
of Juridical Sciences, said, “it would be impractical for drug companies to 
seek patents only after they have conducted years of clinical trials that could 
provide definitive proof that updated drugs work better than their older ver-
sions.”112 Pharmaceutical companies usually seek patents several years before 
they are able to sell a drug on the market.113 Receiving a patent creates the 
incentive for drug manufacturers to perform the clinical trials through which 
they can obtain efficacy data because it guarantees that such data cannot be 
exploited by third parties.114 Thus, requiring proof of efficacy at the time of 
patenting might block many efficacious drugs and thereby impede important 
drug development.115 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of the impact of Novartis AG v. Union of India and similar 
cases is not yet clear, but it is already evident that the 2005 Amendment’s 
changes to Indian patent law are not favorable to multinational pharmaceuti-
cal companies. Section 3(d) poses the greatest threat to these companies by 
significantly restricting their ability to obtain secondary patents on important 
drugs. Because pharmaceutical products are exceedingly expensive to pro-
duce, drug manufacturers rely on the monopolistic rights offered by patents to 
recoup the exorbitant costs of researching and developing such products. 
Thus, when the likelihood of obtaining a patent for a drug is reduced, so too 
is the incentive to develop new drugs. Given the financial upside of partici-
pating in India’s fast-growing pharmaceutical market, the Novartis AG deci-
sion alone will likely not affect western drug companies’ willingness to par-
ticipate in the Indian market. If the Indian courts continue to interpret Section 
3(d)’s enhanced-efficacy requirement narrowly, however, this could obstruct 
important pharmaceutical innovations that—despite not having a healing ef-
fect on the body—promise to help citizens of developed and developing 
countries alike. 
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